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Abstract 
This paper uses Granger causality tests on a fiscal sustainability indicator 
(FSI) and currency crises for 17 countries to evaluate the direction of 
causality between the FSI and currency crises. The FSI developed by Croce 
and Juan-Ramón (2003) is used. Also, different definitions for currency 
crises are used to evaluate whether they induce different results in the 
analysis. In general, the results suggest evidence of causality between the 
lagged FSI and currency crises. 
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1 Introduction 
The establishment of an early warning system that can anticipate the occurrence of currency 
crises has led to debates, both theoretical and empirical. Most of the literature on currency 
crises focuses on the causal role of monetary policy in a crisis. However, theoretical and 
empirical literature on this subject provides a useful framework for the analysis of fiscal 
causes. The first generation models, called speculative attack models, indicate that an 
immoderate fiscal policy is the main cause of currency crises (Krugman, 1979, 1996; Flood 
and Garber, 1984; Flood and Marion, 1996; Van Wijnbergen 1991; Daniel, 2001; Corsetti and 
Mackowiak, 2005, 2006; Burnside et al., 2003, 2006). The second generation models 
accentuate the self-fulfilling characteristics of a currency crisis and the occurrence of multiple 
equilibria (Obstfeld, 1986, 1996; Rangvid, 2001). In these models, the currency attacks occur 
when investors gain new information that government net liabilities exceed a threshold, or 
when the government decides to extract seigniorage, instead of undertaking a fiscal 
adjustment, to meet the intertemporal budget constraint. In other words, the immediate cause 
of the crisis is a sign that the government can only resolve policy inconsistencies abandoning 
the rules of the exchange rate, rather than trying to contain public sector imbalances. Finally, 
third generation models stress the consequences of moral hazard in the banking system and 
the contagion effect as key determinants of a currency crisis (Burnside et al., 2000; Chang and 
Velasco, 2001; Marini and Piersanti, 2003). Here, a sudden loss of confidence triggers a twin 
crisis, combining banking and currency problems, once maturity and currency mismatches in 
banking balance sheets enter a zone of vulnerability. The idea is that a banking system crisis 
will lead to a currency crisis using the first generation models’ mechanism, because 
government contingent liabilities (implicit guarantees) become commitments in the moments of 
crisis and result in unsustainable fiscal deficits, with central banks as lenders of last resort. 
However, the measures taken are inconsistent with the maintenance of fixed exchange rates. 
Empirical studies as developed by Nashashibi and Bazzoni (1993), Eichengreen et al. 
(1994), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Aziz et al. (2000), Siwinska (2000), and Bird and 
Mandilaras (2006) found that fiscal imbalances have a significant effect on the probability of a 
foreign exchange crisis. However, the literature on the subject has paid little attention to the 
role of an indicator of fiscal sustainability in assessing the likelihood of currency crises. On the 
contrary, there are numerous empirical studies on currency crises, which attempt to deduce 
the main indicators that make such crises more predictable, but from the point of view of 
monetary policy (Goldfajn and Valdes, 1997, Burkart and Coudert, 2002, Broome and Morley, 
2004, Crepo-Cuaresma and Slacik, 2007; Frankel and Saravelos, 2012). 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess whether a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (FSI) can be 
used as a leading indicator in predicting currency crises. To do that, the alternative approach 
proposed by Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) is employed to measure the fiscal sustainability of 
each country. Then, the direction of causality between the FSI and currency crises is 
investigated. In addition, three empirical definitions of currency crises are employed. Firstly, an 
exchange market pressure index is constructed as an indicator of currency crises. This 
indicator is calculated by computing a weighted average of the nominal depreciation rate, the 
change in interest rates and international reserves using the United States as the country of 
reference. The quarter in which the index exceeds a certain threshold is taken to be the crisis 
period. Secondly, a crisis is defined as a nominal currency depreciation. Finally, from 
previously mentioned definitions, two binary definitions of currency crises are constructed. 
 
To carry out the research, we used quarterly data from 17 developing countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. 
These countries were selected based on data availability and because most of these countries 
experienced episodes of currency crises in the period 1990-2004. Therefore, the countries and 
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period make a good sample to test our hypothesis. Note that this paper does not give a 
detailed overview of the causes and development of currency crises, but instead, it focuses 
primarily on assessing if the FSI helps predict currency crises. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the different 
definitions of currency crises used. Section 3 describes the sets of data obtained and the 
methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 presents the 
concluding remarks. 
 
The establishment of an early warning system that can anticipate the occurrence of 
currency crises has led to debates, both theoretical and empirical. Most of the literature on 
currency crises focuses on the causal role of monetary policy in a crisis. However, theoretical 
and empirical literature on this subject provides a useful framework for the analysis of fiscal 
causes. The first generation models, called speculative attack models, indicate that an 
immoderate fiscal policy is the main cause of currency crises (Krugman, 1979, 1996; Flood 
and Garber, 1984; Flood and Marion, 1996; Van Wijnbergen 1991; Daniel, 2001; Corsetti and 
Mackowiak, 2005, 2006; Burnside et al., 2003, 2006). The second generation models 
accentuate the self-fulfilling characteristics of a currency crisis and the occurrence of multiple 
equilibria (Obstfeld, 1986, 1996; Rangvid, 2001). In these models, the currency attacks occur 
when investors gain new information that government net liabilities exceed a threshold, or 
when the government decides to extract seigniorage, instead of undertaking a fiscal 
adjustment, to meet the intertemporal budget constraint. In other words, the immediate cause 
of the crisis is a sign that the government can only resolve policy inconsistencies abandoning 
the rules of the exchange rate, rather than trying to contain public sector imbalances. Finally, 
third generation models stress the consequences of moral hazard in the banking system and 
the contagion effect as key determinants of a currency crisis (Burnside et al., 2000; Chang and 
Velasco, 2001; Marini and Piersanti, 2003). Here, a sudden loss of confidence triggers a twin 
crisis, combining banking and currency problems, once maturity and currency mismatches in 
banking balance sheets enter a zone of vulnerability. The idea is that a banking system crisis 
will lead to a currency crisis using the first generation models’ mechanism, because 
government contingent liabilities (implicit guarantees) become commitments in the moments of 
crisis and result in unsustainable fiscal deficits, with central banks as lenders of last resort. 
However, the measures taken are inconsistent with the maintenance of fixed exchange rates. 
 
Empirical studies as developed by Nashashibi and Bazzoni (1993), Eichengreen et al. 
(1994), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Aziz et al. (2000), Siwinska (2000), and Bird and 
Mandilaras (2006) found that fiscal imbalances have a significant effect on the probability of a 
foreign exchange crisis. However, the literature on the subject has paid little attention to the 
role of an indicator of fiscal sustainability in assessing the likelihood of currency crises. On the 
contrary, there are numerous empirical studies on currency crises, which attempt to deduce 
the main indicators that make such crises more predictable, but from the point of view of 
monetary policy (Goldfajn and Valdes, 1997, Burkart and Coudert, 2002, Broome and Morley, 
2004, Crepo-Cuaresma and Slacik, 2007; Frankel and Saravelos, 2012). 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess whether a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (FSI) can be 
used as a leading indicator in predicting currency crises. To do that, the alternative approach 
proposed by Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) is employed to measure the fiscal sustainability of 
each country. Then, the direction of causality between the FSI and currency crises is 
investigated. In addition, three empirical definitions of currency crises are employed. Firstly, an 
exchange market pressure index is constructed as an indicator of currency crises. This 
indicator is calculated by computing a weighted average of the nominal depreciation rate, the 
change in interest rates and international reserves using the United States as the country of 
reference. The quarter in which the index exceeds a certain threshold is taken to be the crisis 
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period. Secondly, a crisis is defined as a nominal currency depreciation. Finally, from 
previously mentioned definitions, two binary definitions of currency crises are constructed. 
 
To carry out the research, we used quarterly data from 17 developing countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. 
These countries were selected based on data availability and because most of these countries 
experienced episodes of currency crises in the period 1990-2004. Therefore, the countries and 
period make a good sample to test our hypothesis. Note that this paper does not give a 
detailed overview of the causes and development of currency crises, but instead, it focuses 
primarily on assessing if the FSI helps predict currency crises. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the different 
definitions of currency crises used. Section 3 describes the sets of data obtained and the 
methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 presents the 
concluding remarks. 
2 Defining Currency Crises  
The definition of a currency crisis is of paramount importance in the process of identifying the 
leading indicators for predicting a crisis itself. Several approaches exist in the literature 
reviewed. In some theoretical works, a currency crisis is predominantly defined only in the 
context of fixed exchange rate regimes, usually as the official devaluation or abandonment of 
the fixed exchange rate regime. However, this definition is not flexible enough to use in 
empirical studies.  
Other empirical studies define a currency crisis as a large (either nominal or real) devaluation 
or depreciation of the domestic currency. However, this last definition does not consider that 
monetary authorities can fight a speculative attack by intervening in the foreign exchange 
market or by increasing interest rates. Under these circumstances, a currency crisis (defined 
as a speculative attack) may not lead to an actual devaluation. As a consequence, 
unsuccessful speculative attacks should be included in the definition of a currency crisis since 
they point to the vulnerability of the system as seen in a fall in international reserves and a rise 
in interest rates (Girton and Roper, 1977; Eichengreen et al., 1996). This paper employs 
different methodologies to define a currency crisis and compares their results. Firstly, an 
indicator is constructed based on the movements in nominal exchange rates according to the 
definition of a currency crisis proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996). This definition of a 
currency crisis only encompasses currency devaluation without a decrease in international 
reserves or an increase in interest rates. We define a crisis as a nominal depreciation of the 
domestic currency in any given quarter that is greater than 6%, exceeding the previous year's 
depreciation level by at least 10%. In other words, this definition assumes that there are only 
successful speculative attacks. This definition is utilised to create a binary variable, a crisis 
indicator called Exchange Rate Depreciation (ERD), equal to one if a crisis occurs and equal 
to zero otherwise. 
Secondly, a definition of a currency crisis is used to refer to an intense increase in speculative 
pressure on the country's currency. Therefore, the measure of exchange rate pressure (MPI) 
developed by Girton and Roper (1977) and modified by Eichengreen et al. (1996) is used. The 
idea being that a successful speculative attack on a currency would show up as a change in 
the exchange rate, but that monetary authorities can fend off these attacks either by raising 
interest rates or by selling off international reserves. The advantage of using this index is that 
both successful and unsuccessful attacks on a currency can be asserted. Then, a given 
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episode can be classified as a speculative attack or crisis period if the MPI is greater in value 
than 1.5 standard deviations over the country's own mean value. Mean values and standard 
deviations are country-specific. As a result, the binary variable is used, identifying the 
speculative attack regime in the sample. However, a major drawback to this approach is that 
the weights, as well as the threshold value used to identify the speculative attacks, are 
somewhat arbitrary. 
3 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis of this paper is performed using quarter frequencies and covers the 
period from the first quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 2004. For the analysis of fiscal 
sustainability in developing countries, data was obtained from the World Bank's Global 
Development Finance (GDF), the IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the CD-ROM 
version of the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS), and the respective Ministry of 
Finance websites. The macroeconomic variables used for MPI calculations were taken from 
the IFS CD-ROM of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Unfortunately, the data for Czech 
Republic were not available before 1993. 
 
In order to avoid a spurious regression situation, unit root tests are performed on the Market 
Pressure Index (MPI) and the exchange rate to investigate whether these variables are 
stationary or not. If the variables are stationary, then the standard Granger causality test is 
appropriate. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is used for this purpose. The 
results suggest that the variables are stationary (these regressions are not presented here, but 
are available upon request). The empirical analysis of this paper is performed using quarter 
frequencies and covers the period from the first quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 2004. 
For the analysis of fiscal sustainability in developing countries, data was obtained from the 
World Bank's Global Development Finance (GDF), the IMF's Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS), the CD-ROM version of the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS), and the 
respective Ministry of Finance websites. The macroeconomic variables used for MPI 
calculations were taken from the IFS CD-ROM of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Unfortunately, the data for Czech Republic were not available before 1993. 
 
In order to avoid a spurious regression situation, unit root tests are performed on the Market 
Pressure Index (MPI) and the exchange rate to investigate whether these variables are 
stationary or not. If the variables are stationary, then the standard Granger causality test is 
appropriate. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is used for this purpose. The 
results suggest that the variables are stationary (these regressions are not presented here, but 
are available upon request). The empirical analysis of this paper is performed using quarter 
frequencies and covers the period from the first quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 2004. 
For the analysis of fiscal sustainability in developing countries, data was obtained from the 
World Bank's Global Development Finance (GDF), the IMF's Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS), the CD-ROM version of the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS), and the 
respective Ministry of Finance websites. The macroeconomic variables used for MPI 
calculations were taken from the IFS CD-ROM of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Unfortunately, the data for Czech Republic were not available before 1993. 
In order to avoid a spurious regression situation, unit root tests are performed on the Market 
Pressure Index (MPI) and the exchange rate to investigate whether these variables are 
stationary or not. If the variables are stationary, then the standard Granger causality test is 
appropriate. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is used for this purpose. The 
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results suggest that the variables are stationary (these regressions are not presented here, but 
are available upon request). 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The summary of descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (market pressure index and 
the exchange rate depreciation) is listed in Table 1 and 2, respectively. In addition, the 
movements of these variables during the sampled period are depicted in Figure 1. The 
exchange rates are expressed as variations of the foreign currency per US dollar.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Market Pressure Index  
Country Mean Median Max. Min. St.Dev. Skew. Kurtosis Obs 
Argentina 0.719 -1.856 131.121 -81.828 23.878 2.428 18.608 60 
Brazil 5.638 1.940 123.626 -78.875 23.404 1.442 14.359 60 
Chile -0.326 -0.151 6.366 -9.064 3.017 -0.332 2.997 60 
Colombia 0.320 0.025 7.878 -6.276 2.596 0.326 3.496 60 
Costa Rica 1.363 1.183 7.110 -5.701 1.939 -0.186 6.037 60 
Czech Rep. -1.084 -1.055 11.492 -7.881 3.163 0.947 6.970 47 
Dom. Rep. 0.330 0.169 8.079 -8.431 3.063 -0.003 3.714 60 
El Salvador -0.245 -0.218 2.775 -3.556 0.916 -0.072 6.449 60 
Honduras 0.217 -0.117 4.017 -2.878 1.290 0.822 4.036 60 
Hungary 0.039 0.066 5.0602 -4.841 1.758 -0.144 4.626 60 
Indonesia -0.606 -0.950 13.789 -8.670 3.879 1.289 7.249 60 
Malaysia -0.127 -0.184 2.841 -3.706 0.902 0.159 8.909 60 
Mexico 0.056 -0.834 26.327 -13.777 5.181 2.426 13.745 60 
Peru -0.178 -0.410 59.533 -60.950 15.827 0.961 11.504 60 
Philippines 0.128 0.073 9.484 -5.994 3.330 0.452 3.346 60 
Thailand -0.561 -0.852 11.781 -7.433 2.786 1.485 8.615 60 
Turkey 3.381 2.708 35.815 -31.467 9.427 0.402 7.706 60 
All Countries 0.554 -0.116 131.122 -81.828 9.701 4.146 75.881 1007 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Exchange Rate Depreciation 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. St.Dev. Skew. Kurtosis Obs 
Argentina 7.583 0.000 195.147 -11.747 33.581 4.664 24.209 60 
Brazil 34.339 2.964 274.715 -14.700 60.368 1.977 6.688 60 
Chile 1.153 1.548 11.103 -9.879 4.257 -0.380 3.155 60 
Colombia 3.046 3.107 17.928 -10.525 5.552 0.340 3.638 60 
Costa Rica 2.878 2.517 11.492 -1.784 1.866 1.995 10.279 60 
Czech Rep. -0.366 -0.757 20.063 -16.991 5.923 0.277 5.589 47 
Dom. Rep. 3.083 1.178 38.926 -30.896 9.271 1.173 10.362 60 
El Salvador 1.117 0.000 53.200 -4.798 6.972 7.125 53.694 60 
Honduras 6.951 1.337 310.000 -50.000 40.531 7.094 53.935 60 
Hungary 1.921 2.615 22.326 -11.627 5.425 0.321 5.424 60 
Indonesia 3.987 1.197 79.032 -28.187 17.684 2.592 12.167 60 
Malaysia 0.690 0.000 26.485 -8.851 5.244 3.285 15.764 60 
Mexico 2.758 0.904 56.433 -7.455 8.889 4.204 24.341 60 
Peru 29.157 1.651 1216.065 -3.731 158.675 7.172 53.986 60 
Philippines 1.709 0.241 28.384 -10.842 6.021 1.778 8.651 60 
Thailand 0.955 -0.197 41.617 -17.869 7.694 3.108 17.452 60 
Turkey 11.823 10.856 53.116 -17.200 12.313 0.948 5.823 60 
All Countries 7.583 0.000 195.147 -11.747 33.581 4.664 24.209 60 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
According to Tables 1 and 2, Brazil, Peru and Turkey show the highest quarter averages of 
the MPI and depreciation in their exchange rates. Most of the countries considered displayed 
high degrees of volatility in their exchange markets, given that the standard deviations are 
always more than double their mean value. Nonetheless, Table 1 shows that Chile, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Hungary have negative skewness (and only Chile 
in Table 2), which implies that more tranquil periods in which the exchange rates remain more 
or less stable tend to occur more often than large speculative attacks or depreciations in their 
foreign exchange markets. Similarly, for some countries, the maximum MPI is recorded in the 
first half of the 1990s when the exchange rate depreciation reached its peak (see Figure 1). In 
contrast, for countries which presented currency crises in the late 1990s, the maximum of MPI 
and exchange rate depreciation are recorded in the second half of the 1990s. 
 
 
8 of 19 
  
Figure 1: Index of Speculative Pressure and Exchange Rate Depreciation 
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4 Methodology  
 
To evaluate fiscal sustainability, this paper uses the recursive algorithm developed by Croce 
and Juan-Ramón (2003). In order to derive a simple expression for the index of fiscal 
sustainability, it is assumed that the debt ratio (debt to GDP) at time 1t   is higher than the 
long-term objective for that ratio 
 *1td d  . Hence, td would converge to *d , if and only if 
1t t   , where t
d
is public debt as a share of GDP (the law of motion in the debt to GDP 
ratio), 
*d  is the target debt ratio, 
1
1
t
t
r
g




,  t
r
 is the real interest rate and t
g
 denotes the 
rate of growth of real output. The parameter t

 indicates the intensity of the policy response at 
time t, given the debt ratio gap in the previous period. Therefore, we can use 
 t t   as an 
indicator of fiscal sustainability. Accordingly, an alternative expression for the Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator (FSI) is: 
  
 
*
*
1
1
1
t t
t t t
t t
r ps ps
FSI
g d d
 

  
    
                  (1) 
 
where t
ps
 is the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP. This expression states that a persistently 
higher spread between the observed real interest rate and the observed growth rate of real 
GDP would, other than being equal, lead to higher public indebtedness (high parameter t

). 
The second parameter ( t

), measures the ratio between the deviation of observed and target 
values of the primary surplus and the public debt ratios. In addition, a fiscal position would be 
sustainable if 
1tFSI  . In contrast, if 
1tFSI   then the fiscal position is unsustainable.  
 
To test for the causal relationship between the FSI and the occurrence of currency crises, 
the standard Granger test is employed. This test is used to evaluate how much of the current 
currency crisis can be explained by lagged values of the FSI. Thus, the FSI is said to Granger 
cause the currency crisis if the FSI variable is statistically significant and therefore improves 
the forecasted value of the currency crisis. The test equations used are given by: 
 
1
k
t i t i t
i
Y X  

  
                               (2) 
 
1
k
t i t i t
i
X Y  

  
                               (3) 
  
where Y  is a currency crisis, X  is a leading indicator (in this case, the  FSI),   and   are 
the respective intercepts, and t

 is a white noise error term. If the inclusion of variable X  with 
lag i  in the test equation helps in the prediction of Y , then Y  is said to be Granger caused by 
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t iX  . Separately, if 1
k
i
i



 in equation (2) is significantly different from zero, then we conclude 
that currency crises cause the FSI.  Granger causality in both directions is, of course, a 
possibility. This can be possibly explained by high fiscal costs of defense of fixed exchange 
rates. The fiscal sustainability indicator is supposed to capture the state of fiscal fundamentals. 
Then, an unsustainable fiscal position would be expected to help in the prediction of the risk of 
devaluation or a speculative attack. It is important to note that Granger causality mainly 
concerns prediction and does not refer to real causality.  
 
5 Empirical Results 
To construct the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (FSI), following Croce and Juan-Ramón 
(2003), we use 
*d  equal to the lowest value reached by the debt ratio during the period under 
study in each country. The value of  
*
 represents the median of the distribution of the 
observed values of 

 for the group of developing countries. Its value was set at 1.026. This 
implies that the expected value of the real interest rate is 2.6 percentage points higher than the 
real growth rate, in a steady state. 
Table 3 shows the countries with problems of fiscal sustainability during 1990Q1-2004Q4. 
Countries for which the FSI was above the threshold of 1 at least 75% of the times were 
classified as having been fiscally unsustainable 
 1  
 during the period considered. 
Also, Table 3 shows the frequency of 

 values being higher than 
*
, and the frequency of   
assuming a negative value (implying primary deficit). In general, the developing countries in 
the sample present an unsustainable fiscal stance explained mostly by government fiscal 
deficits rather than spreads between the real interest rates and the growth rates. Figure 2 
presents the result of the FSI for each country considered, arranged alphabetically to facilitate 
the discussion. As shown in Figure 2, a higher FSI reflects fiscal unsustainability. 
 
According to Table 3, Argentina shows an unsustainable fiscal position in 87% of the period 
studied, while Brazil shows an unsustainable fiscal stance in about 62%. On the contrary, Chile 
shows a sustainable fiscal stance in most of the period considered. The FSI for Colombia, 
Costa Rica and the Czech Republic has consistently maintained an unsustainable fiscal 
position as a result of a primary fiscal deficit and a higher real interest rate-growth gap, 
respectively. For El Salvador, Honduras and Hungary the FSI persistently presented an 
unsustainable fiscal stance, explained fundamentally by the primary government deficit. The 
Dominican Republic shows an unsustainable fiscal position in 40% of the period studied, while 
Indonesia shows a sustainable fiscal position in 50% of period. Malaysia shows a consistently 
sustainable fiscal balance in the period under study. However, the FSI for Mexico, Peru and 
Philippines presents an unsustainable fiscal position stance during most of the period 
consided. On contrary, the fiscal sustainability indicator for Thailand indicated sustainability in 
38% of the period. Finally, the fiscal sustainability indicator for Turkey shows an unsustainable 
fiscal position overall in the period studied.  
 
In summary, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Hungary, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines and Turkey present large unsustainable fiscal positions 
throughout most of the period studied, which is fundamentally explained by primary fiscal 
deficits. 
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Table 3: Analysis of Fiscal Sustainability Indicators  
 
Country 
Frequency 
1     *    0    
Argentina 87% 42% 95% 
Brazil 62% 42% 60% 
Chile 33% 3% 33% 
Colombia 93% 37% 100% 
Costa Rica 100% 2% 100% 
Czech Republic 95% 20% 84% 
Dominican Republic 40% 20% 40% 
El Salvador 97% 3% 100% 
Honduras 98% 13% 100% 
Hungary 95% 30% 97% 
Indonesia 50% 2% 60% 
Malaysia 47% 7% 77% 
Mexico 83% 18% 85% 
Peru 80% 42% 93% 
Philippines 98% 10% 100% 
Thailand 38% 13% 38% 
Turkey 100% 50% 100% 
Developing Countries 76% 21% 80% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Number of quarters as a percentage of total quarters. 
 
 
The issue of causality between the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator and currency crises is 
analysed for each country and for the sample as a whole. To do this, the Granger causality test 
is used, as well as three different definitions of currency crises. Firstly, we use the Market 
Pressure Index (MPI) defined earlier. Then, we use the binary definition of currency crises 
(defined to be one if the deviation of the MPI exceeds 1.5 standard deviations over the 
country's own mean value). Finally, we use the binary definition of the exchange rate 
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depreciation (equal to one if the nominal depreciation of the domestic currency is greater than 
6%, but exceeding the previous year's depreciation level by at least 10%). 
 
 
 Figure 2: Fiscal Sustainability Indicators 
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The results for the Granger causality test are very sensitive to the selection of lag lengths. If 
the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission of relevant lags can cause 
bias. If the chosen lag length is greater, the irrelevant lags in the equation cause the estimates 
to be inefficient. To deal with this problem, we use the Final Prediction Error (FPE) and the 
Akaike criterion. We estimated ten regressions according to equation (2) and compute the 
FPE for each regression as:  
 
1
1
T m
RSS
T mFPE
T
 
 
 
 
where T  is sample size, m  is the lag length and RSS is the residual sum of squares. We 
choose the optimal lag length as the lag length which produces the lowest FPE.  
 
The conventional Granger causality tests are reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The results for 
the whole sample considered in this study show that there is not causality between FSI and 
currency crises (see Table 4). On the contrary, when a definition of currency crises according 
to nominal exchange rate depreciation (ERD) is used, the Granger causality test results show 
that the FSI affects ERD; but nominal exchange rate depreciation does not affect the FSI in the 
whole sample (see Table 5). Similarly, the results demonstrate that there is a one-directional 
relationship between the FSI and the index of speculative pressure (see Table 6). In other 
words, the fiscal sustainability index helps predict the probability of currency crisis. In 
Argentina's case, the null hypothesis that the FSI does not Granger cause currency crises in 
both definitions is rejected, but not the other way around. Similarly, the results in Table 6 show 
that there is causality only from the FSI to the MPI. It is important to note that Argentina shows 
an unsustainable fiscal stance in 87% of the period studied (see Table 3). 
 
The result of the bivariate Granger tests for Brazil show that the FSI affects the MPI and 
vice versa. However, the results suggest no evidence of causality from the FSI to currency 
crises. On the contrary, for Chile, the Granger causality test results show that the FSI causes 
ERD, but not the other way around. In the case of Chile, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the FSI does not Granger cause currency crises. Similarly, the results for this country 
show no causality relationship from the FSI to the MPI. This is according with the results 
showed in Tables 1 and 2. Chile has negative skewness, which implies that more stable 
periods in the exchange market tend to occur more often than large speculative attacks or 
depreciations. For Colombia, the results of the Granger causality test show that the FSI only 
causes currency crises, but not ERD and MPI. Colombia has consistently maintained an 
unsustainable fiscal position as a result of a primary fiscal deficit and a higher real interest 
rate-growth gap (Table 3). Meanwhile, for Costa Rica, the FSI causes currency crises, 
exchange rate depreciation and speculative pressure in the exchange market. On the contrary, 
in the Czech Republic, the results show there is no relationship between the FSI, currency 
crises and the MPI. Results for the Dominican Republic show that causality runs from the FSI 
to crises and from the FSI to the MPI. That is, the FSI helps predict the probability of currency 
crisis occurrence. 
 
For El Salvador, Honduras, Hungary and Indonesia, the results show that there is no 
causality between the variables considered, except from currency crises to the FSI in Hungary 
and Indonesia. Results for El Salvador and Hungary are in accordance with results showed in 
Tables 1 and 2. Those two countries have more stable periods than large speculative attacks 
or depreciations in their foreign exchange market. On the contrary, the results for Malaysia 
show that the Granger causality runs both ways between the FSI and currency crises, and 
between the FSI and the ERD. However, it only shows causality from the MPI to the FSI. While 
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the results for Mexico reveal that the Granger causality runs one-way from the FSI to the ERD. 
This result indicates that a lagged FSI helps predict the risk of a currency attack. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Granger Causality Tests between the FSI and Currency Crises  
Country Null Hypothesis Obs Lags F-Statistic Probability 
All Countries 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
970 2 0.092 
0.159 
0.912 
0.853 
Argentina 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 2.714 
0.496 
0.041 
0.738 
Brazil 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
Chile 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 0.032 
0.019 
0.998 
0.999 
Colombia 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 4.119 
0.447 
0.006 
0.774 
Costa Rica 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
58 2 7.267 
2.746 
0.001 
0.073 
Czech Republic 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
42 2 0.488 
0.093 
0.617 
0.911 
Dominican 
Republic 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
58 2 2.477 
1.385 
0.094 
0.259 
El Salvador 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
58 2 0.369 
1.264 
0.692 
0.290 
Honduras 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
57 3 0.393 
0.644 
0.758 
0.589 
Hungary 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
55 5 1.917 
3.364 
0.110 
0.011 
Indonesia 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 1.185 
2.208 
0.329 
0.082 
Malaysia 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 4.611 
18.658 
0.003 
0.000 
Mexico 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
55 5 0.734 
0.698 
0.602 
0.627 
Peru 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
59 1 78.501 
996.609 
0.000 
0.000 
Philippines 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 7.073 
6.114 
0.000 
0.000 
Thailand 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 6.567 
1.843 
0.000 
0.136 
Turkey 
FSI does not Granger cause Crises 
Crises do not Granger cause FSI 
59 1 0.674 
6.587 
0.415 
0.013 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 5: Granger Causality Tests between the FSI and ERD  
Country Null Hypothesis Obs Lags F-Statistic Probability 
All Countries 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
953 3 3.993 
0.487 
0.008 
0.691 
Argentina 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 3.610 
0.365 
0.012 
0.832 
Brazil 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
59 1 1.854 
5.172 
0.178 
0.026 
Chile 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 2.521 
0.636 
0.053 
0.639 
Colombia 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
57 3 0.148 
0.211 
0.931 
0.888 
Costa Rica 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
55 5 24.306 
15.746 
0.000 
0.000 
Czech Republic 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
40 4 0.593 
0.508 
0.670 
0.729 
Dominican 
Republic 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
59 1 0.949 
0.350 
0.334 
0.556 
El Salvador 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
58 2 0.399 
1.359 
0.672 
0.265 
Honduras 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
59 1 0.518 
1.698 
0.474 
0.197 
Hungary 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
59 1 0.235 
0.021 
0.629 
0.882 
Indonesia 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
58 2 0.191 
2.455 
0.826 
0.095 
Malaysia 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
57 3 6.489 
8.428 
0.000 
0.000 
Mexico 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 3.720 
1.586 
0.010 
0.193 
Peru 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 6.311 
19.301 
0.000 
0.000 
Philippines 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
58 2 2.650 
5.885 
0.079 
0.004 
Thailand 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 4.865 
1.087 
0.002 
0.373 
Turkey 
FSI does not Granger cause ERD 
ERD does not Granger cause FSI 
58 2 3.492 
1.197 
0.037 
0.309 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 6: Granger Causality Tests between the FSI and MPI  
Country Null Hypothesis Obs Lags F-Statistic Probability 
All Countries 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
919 5 6.566 
0.510 
0.000 
0.769 
Argentina 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
59 1 6.490 
0.067 
0.013 
0.795 
Brazil 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 5.112 
2.393 
0.001 
0.063 
Chile 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 0.153 
2.561 
0.960 
0.050 
Colombia 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 1.143 
2.122 
0.348 
0.093 
Costa Rica 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
55 5 4.799 
2.309 
0.001 
0.060 
Czech Republic 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
42 2 1.359 
0.428 
0.269 
0.655 
Dominican 
Republic 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 2.867 
0.454 
0.033 
0.769 
El Salvador 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 0.092 
0.998 
0.984 
0.418 
Honduras 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 0.209 
1.066 
0.932 
0.383 
Hungary 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
59 1 1.911 
0.042 
0.172 
0.838 
Indonesia 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 0.689 
1.021 
0.603 
0.405 
Malaysia 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 1.949 
2.858 
0.117 
0.033 
Mexico 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
55 5 0.444 
0.999 
0.815 
0.429 
Peru 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 4.527 
5.834 
0.003 
0.000 
Philippines 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
57 3 4.666 
3.356 
0.006 
0.026 
Thailand 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
56 4 4.088 
1.145 
0.006 
0.347 
Turkey 
FSI does not Granger cause MPI 
MPI does not Granger cause FSI 
58 2 2.797 
0.394 
0.070 
0.676 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
The results of the Granger tests using four lags for Peru show that there is bi-directional 
causality between the FSI and the ERD, and between the FSI and the MPI. In addition, when 
one lag is used, the causality runs in two-ways between the FSI and currency crises. Similarly, 
the results for the Philippines show a bi-directional relationship between the FSI and currency 
crises, the FSI and the MPI, and the FSI and ERD. The Granger causality test results for 
Thailand show that the FSI affects currency crises, the MPI and the ERD. Those results 
suggest that a lagged FSI helps predict currency crises. While for Turkey, the null hypothesis 
that the FSI does not Granger cause currency crises cannot be rejected, but the results show 
that there is Granger causality from the FSI to the MPI and from the FSI to the ERD. The 
results for this country indicate that an unsustainable fiscal position helps predict the 
probability of a currency crisis. 
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On the other hand, it is possible that devaluation or depreciation worsens the debt burden 
and the fiscal sustainability through an increase in the real value of foreign currency debt. 
Similarly, an increase in the domestic interest rate (to defend the currency) may also affect the 
debt burden if it is a variable-rate or a short-term, in which case it has to be rolled-over 
regularly. Of course, a major concern here is the potential endogeneity of the explanatory 
variable. Then, the Davidson and MacKinnon (1989) version of Hausman's specification test 
was performed as a formal test for endogeneity of the FSI. To carry out the Hausman test, we 
run two simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (these regressions are not presented 
here, but are available upon request). A set of potential instrumental variables that are 
correlated with the suspected FSI variable is used, including lagged values of MPI. In the first 
regression, we regress the potentially endogenous FSI variable on instrumental variables and 
retrieve the residuals. Then, the residuals were used as an additional explanatory variable in a 
regression of the MPI on the actual FSI. An F-statistic was used to test the null hypothesis that 
the estimated coefficients of the residuals are jointly equal to zero. If they are, there is no 
endogeneity. The results show that most of the models pass the test (see Table 7). The null 
hypothesis was not rejected at the 1% and 5% levels. In the case of El Salvador, the test 
rejected the hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 5% level. Also, a cross correlation between 
the lagged MPI and the error term is carried out. Results show that the lagged MPI and the 
error term are uncorrelated. 
 
To summarise, the results suggest that the fiscal sustainability indicator helps predict the 
probability of currency crises. The analysis reveals interesting results, particularly for those 
countries with large unsustainable fiscal positions in the period considered. Results for 
Argentina show that there are deep connections between unsustainable fiscal positions (in 
87% of the period studied) and currency crises (those occurring in 1990, 1995, and 2000). 
Similar results are drawn for Turkey (for the crises occurring in 2000 and 2001) and countries 
in South-East Asia, among others. Also, we no found endogeneity between variables in most 
of the countries. 
 
Table 7: Hausman Endogeneity Test  
Country Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Probability 
Argentina There is no endogeneity 1.829 0.073 
Brazil There is no endogeneity -1.097 0.277 
Chile There is no endogeneity -1.389 0.173 
Colombia There is no endogeneity 0.461 0.647 
Costa Rica There is no endogeneity -0.645 0.521 
Czech Republic There is no endogeneity 1.270 0.211 
Dominican Republic There is no endogeneity -1.484 0.143 
El Salvador There is no endogeneity 2.384 0.022 
Honduras There is no endogeneity 1.864 0.068 
Hungary There is no endogeneity 1.984 0.052 
Indonesia There is no endogeneity -1.204 0.233 
Malaysia There is no endogeneity -0.129 0.897 
Mexico There is no endogeneity -0.609 0.544 
Peru There is no endogeneity 1.017 0.313 
Philippines There is no endogeneity -5.002 0.618 
Thailand There is no endogeneity -1.645 0.105 
Turkey There is no endogeneity -0.734 0.466 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper addressed the issue of the leading indicators that can anticipate the occurrence 
of currency crises. None of the previous empirical studies had focused on whether a Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator may predict a currency crisis. This work attempted to bridge this gap. 
Firstly, a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator has been constructed for 17 developing countries and 
we classified the countries for which the FSI was above the threshold of 1 at least 75% of the 
time as having been fiscally unsustainable, and then different measures of currency crises 
were defined. Eleven countries were identified as presenting large unsustainable fiscal 
positions in most of the period studied, explained basically by a primary fiscal deficit.  
 
A Granger causality test was used in order to analyse the issue of causality between the 
Fiscal Sustainability Indicator and currency crises. This paper documents that the fiscal 
sustainability indicator helps predict the probability of currency crises, but in some cases this 
relationship is dependent on the definition of currency crises employed. Also, the empirical 
evidence is equally ambiguous. In some of the countries considered, the Granger causality 
tests suggest evidence of bi-causality between the FSI and currency crises. In others, there is 
evidence of causality running only from currency crises to the FSI. An explanation could be 
that changes in exchange rates can cause changes in the sustainability of fiscal policy and an 
unsustainable fiscal position provokes pressure on the exchange rate markets. However, in 
most of the countries, we found no evidence of endogeneity between the FSI and the MPI. 
Interestingly, for El Salvador, the results show that there is no causality between the variables 
considered. However, there is endogeneity between the FSI and the MPI.  
 
Obviously, the analysis of only fiscal indicators is not enough to fully assess the probability 
of the occurrence of a currency crisis. Of course, the Granger causality test is at the expense 
of a more sophisticated econometric model that could potentially assess the quantitative 
relationship between the FSI and currency crises. In spite of these, our empirical findings 
seem to provide supporting evidence for some authors, who argue that fiscal policy plays an 
important role in generating currency crises.  
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